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Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
In this thesis we analyze how patent policy affects the strategic behavior of firms. We develop an infinite horizon model of innovation where
each period firms are randomly matched to ideas which can be developed into innovations. The model allows for simultaneous independent
discovery so that the number of firms producing the same innovation is determined endogenously. The issues that we consider are (1) innovators'
optimal choice of protection between patents and (trade) secrecy, and (2) the effect of patents on the firms' ability to sustain tacit collusion.
In studying the choice of protection, we find that firms may find it optimal to patent even if patent protection is weaker than protection under
secrecy. This follows because of the prisoner's dilemma created by the patent policy: If no one else patents, the firm gets the patent and the
corresponding monopoly profits for sure whereas secrecy yields only oligopoly profits in the event that there are others that have developed the
same innovation. On the hand, if the competitors patent when successful, then secrecy yields positive profits only when no competitor is
successful with the same innovation. Applying for the patent gives the innovator a chance of receiving a monopoly even when others are
successful. This explains how the patent policy can at the same time enhance incentives to innovate and increase the spreading of information
through increased spillovers. We show that welfare maximizing patent policy may either reduce or increase spillovers.
Turning to the effects of patents on the competitiveness of an industry, we argue that a patent system makes collusion among innovators more
difficult. Our argument is based on two properties of the patent system. First, a patent not only protects against infringement but also against
punishment by former collusion members. Second, a deviator has an equal chance with the former collusion members to get a patent on future
innovations. We show that if a patent system reduces spillovers, it renders collusion impossible. Moreover, it is possible to design a patent
system that simultaneously increases knowledge spillovers and eliminates collusion.
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